Notebooks for our article
These notebooks present all the instructions that we used to generate the numerical data, tables and figures of our article, currently under submission: Voter Coordination in Elections: A Case for Approval Voting (François Durand, Antonin Macé and Matías Núñez). The references inside parentheses correspond to the section numbers in the article.
- Ordinal Equilibria: Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting (4.1, C.1)
- Dynamic Process: Base Case (5.2.1, 5.2.4, 5.3, C.8, C.9)
- Dynamic Process: Condorcet Profiles (5.2.1, 5.2.2, C.6)
- Dynamic Process: Non-Condorcet Profiles (5.2.1, C.6)
- Dynamic Process: Single-Peaked Profiles (C.1)
- Dynamic Process: With Some Expressive Voters (C.7)
- Dynamic Process: With Some Expressive Voters and a CW (5.4)
- Dynamic Process: Robustness to the Belief Updating Parameter (C.2)
- Dynamic Process: Robustness to the Belief Updating Parameter (with CW) (C.2)
- Dynamic Process: Robustness to the Share of Updating Voters (C.2)
- Dynamic Process: Robustness to the Share of Updating Voters (with CW) (C.2)
- Dynamic Process: Robustness to the Distribution of Preference Intensities (C.3)
- Dynamic Process: Robustness to the Initial Poll (C.4)
- Divided Preferences: Approval (5.2.3)
- Divided Preferences: Plurality (5.2.3)
- Divided Preferences: Anti-Plurality (C.5)
- Discussion of the Equilibrium Concept (6)
- A (difficult) example (B.4)
- The Bad Apple example (C.5.2)
- Confidence Intervals (C.10)